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The 2020s will be critical for climate action. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change calls for a 45% cut of 
global carbon emissions by 2030 to limit global warming 
so as to attain the 2015 Paris Agreement targets of 1.5°C 
or at most 2°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of 
this century. Scientists warn that beyond a 2°C increase, 
the planet’s ice sheets could collapse, resulting in the 
flooding of hundreds of coastal cities. Around 400 million 
people could suffer from water scarcity leading to crop 
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failures and food shortages while parts of the equatorial 
band would become uninhabitable, with summer heat 
waves killing thousands even in Northern latitudes (Wal-
lace-Wells, 2019).  
The international community is not doing enough to pre-
vent this scenario. Based on current policies, global 
warming is set to reach 3°C by 2100. In 2015, as leaders 
gathered in Paris, carbon concentration in the atmos-
phere hit the historic record of 400 parts per million 
(ppm), considered to be a “dangerous red line”. It con-
tinued to increase ever since, reaching 412 ppm in 2020. 
18 of the 19 warmest years recorded have occurred after 
2001. Since 1980, an area as large as India has already 
melted from the Arctic ice cap, sea levels have risen by 
over ten centimetres and we have witnessed ever more 
frequent extreme weather events.  
This policy brief will first argue why, faced with the 
threat of climate change, ‘business as usual’ is no longer 
an option. It will then turn to the question of how and 
under what conditions the European Union (EU), through 
its December 2019 European Green Deal (EGD), could es-
tablish a new narrative and successfully tackle the chal-
lenge ahead. The brief will finally look at the interna-
tional implications of the European Green Deal and how 
EU policy-makers can best manage them. 
 
‘Business as usual’: globally and in the EU 
Despite all technological progress, the global economy has 
never used as many natural resources as it does today. In 
2017, it consumed over 87 billion tonnes of raw materials 
(up from 52 billion in 2000). Per capita, this translates into 
11.6 tonnes annually. The same year humanity burned 
more fossil fuels – in absolute terms – than ever before, 
even as the share of renewable sources in the global en-
ergy mix increased in relative terms. The global economy 
Executive Summary 
> Inspired by “the passion, conviction and energy of 
the millions of young people making their voice 
heard on our streets and in our hearts”, in Decem-
ber 2019, the European Commission proposed a 
‘European Green Deal’ aimed at reducing carbon 
emissions by at least 50% by 2030 and achieving 
carbon neutrality by 2050. 
> The European Green Deal has significant global 
ramifications and therefore an important impact 
on the EU’s external action, involving its diplo-
matic, cooperation and trade instruments.   
> Bold action is not only needed internally to decar-
bonise and dematerialise our economies but also 
externally to support the EU’s international part-
ners in their efforts to tackle the climate emer-
gency.  
> In this context, technological and financial sup-
port will not be enough because climate change 
is quintessentially a political problem. The EU 
should be ready to challenge the entrenched 
elites, at home and in partner countries, that ben-
efit from the status quo and resist change. 
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feeds a voracious metabolism that endlessly extracts re-
sources on one end of the world, transports them to an-
other, has them assembled with other resources from yet 
other regions, based on know-how developed elsewhere, 
to be finally sold in one place and, once consumed, 
dumped somewhere else. 
Humanity needs to completely rethink this degenerative 
system (Raworth, 2017; Jackson, 2017). In this effort to ad-
dress the “climate emergency” (European Parliament, 
2019), high-income countries must set the example by 
making the biggest effort. This effort cannot be based on 
appeals to individual responsibility or technical solutions 
only. For one, it would be misleading to think that chang-
ing course is only a matter of personal choice and behav-
iour. Individuals are powerless when faced with, for exam-
ple, the lack of access to renewable energy or public 
transport infrastructure, a fiscal system subsidising fossil 
fuels or car purchases (rather than renewable energy or 
eco-innovation), an advertising industry and an entire sys-
tem of values glorifying consumerism. Equally misleading 
is the idea that climate change is merely a technical prob-
lem in need of technical solutions. Climate change is quin-
tessentially a political problem because it touches upon 
questions of justice: the most vulnerable people on the 
planet, who least contribute to carbon emissions, are hit 
the hardest. The wealthy will be able to escape heat, hun-
ger and conflict while the rest of the world is left to suffer, 
in a scenario the United Nations describes as “climate 
apartheid”.  
Understanding the political nature of climate change is a 
first step towards seriously addressing the challenge 
ahead. The second important step is assessing its global 
dimensions and Europe's historic and present responsibil-
ity. The EU covers roughly 3% of the world’s landmass and 
Europeans represent 7% of the world population. CO2 gen-
erated on European soil amounts to 10% of global carbon 
emissions, not considering the EU’s ‘outsourced emis-
sions’. The bloc imports 38% of textiles, 38% of agricultural 
products, 26% of minerals, 26% of crude oil, 38% of metals 
and 39% of chemicals flowing in international markets 
(Harvard University, 2017). There is an organic relationship 
between Europe’s metabolism, with its material and im-
material throughput, and the power structures in the rest 
of the world that are shaped by these flows. The rise of 
China – already the top consumer of most material re-
sources – and other emerging powers, is warping these 
gravitational forces away from Europe and North America, 
but the transatlantic weight will continue to remain im-
portant.  
The mechanics of natural resource extraction and trade re-
quire economies of scale that only large operators can 
muster, creating a natural bias towards concentration. Ex-
tractive economies tend to be less democratic precisely 
because they concentrate this power in fewer hands (Ace-
moğlu & Robinson, 2012). Many of the EU’s international 
partners are largely dependent on natural resource rents, 
defined by the World Bank as the sum of revenues from 
oil, natural gas, coal, mineral and forest. So long as the ex-
ploitation of natural resources remains at the heart of the 
global economic system, autocratic regimes and en-
trenched interest groups will continue to profit from it. In 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, oil revenues make for 
60% and 30% of the state budgets, respectively. Without 
these rents, the two regimes could not have consolidated 
their power at home, waged proxy wars or propped up 
friendly governments in the region.  
A degenerative economic model based on endless mate-
rial consumption is not only shaping power structures in 
Europe’s partner countries, but also in Europe itself. The 
deals between local and international elites over the con-
trol of these rents should not be ignored when trying to 
understand the forces of resistance against climate action. 
Unlike Saudi Arabia, which today holds a sizeable share of 
its oil revenues, with international actors making profits 
later down the retail chain or in the management of Saudi 
sovereign wealth funds, in other cases international play-
ers, often European companies, have the upper hand over 
producing countries. The supply chains of cobalt from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, uranium from Niger, or 
copper from Zambia are just a few examples. The en-
trenched elites across all countries of the globe benefitting 
from the status quo will likely resist the economic overhaul 
needed to tackle climate change.  
Yet, the EU could become part of the solution if it is ready 
to use its leverage to challenge them and promote a new 
narrative. 
The ‘European Green Deal ‘- a new narrative? 
In December 2019, the European Commission proposed a 
‘European Green Deal’ with the goal of transforming the 
EU’s economy for a sustainable future. The EGD aims inter 
alia to reduce carbon emissions by at least 50% by 2030 
and reach carbon neutrality by 2050. It proposes a clean 
energy transition, a new circular economy action plan, a 
shift to sustainable and smart mobility, leadership on 
other environmental issues such as single-use plastics and, 
among other measures, a Sustainable Europe Investment 
Fund. The Commission’s proposal recognises that “the 
global challenges of climate change and environmental 
degradation require a global response” and that the EU’s 
efforts at home will need to be accompanied by ambitious 
environment, climate and energy policies across the 
world, supported by a stronger ‘green deal diplomacy’, 
trade policy, development support and other EU external 
policies (European Commission, 2019).  
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To live up to its aspiration, the EGD should clearly break 
from ‘business-as-usual’ and unequivocally set bold tar-
gets to reduce the carbon footprint of the EU’s economy, 
starting from those sectors that, alone, contribute to al-
most three quarters of global carbon emissions: energy 
(34%), industry (22%) and transport (14%). To this end, the 
EGD should go beyond the simple target of reducing car-
bon emissions, which could be externalised, but also aim 
to reduce absolute energy consumption and achieve a full 
transition to renewable energy, reduce material consump-
tion, reduce waste per person and increase recycling, and 
decouple the notions of mobility and car ownership, 
providing transport opportunities through common and 
public options while stabilising or reducing the number of 
vehicles in circulation. By setting the example at home, the 
EU will be in a better position to advocate similar objec-
tives at global level.   
In its efforts, the EU should be guided by the idea that turn-
ing the tables on energy, waste and transport is not just a 
concern for high-income countries. The highest gains are 
actually to be made in low- and middle-income nations 
faced with higher air pollution levels, more congested ur-
ban traffic and related health and environmental hazards. 
The World Health Organisation estimates that 98% of cit-
ies in the developing world are suffering from air pollution 
above the safety threshold (WHO, 2016). Not only can cli-
mate action help achieve social goals and prevent societal 
collapse, but it will also have significant ’equalising effects’ 
when it comes to sharing resources and opportunities. 
With adequate public investment in renewables, house-
holds could produce sufficient energy to meet most of 
their needs and wrestle power away from energy rent-
seekers. Likewise, public transportation would help the 
most vulnerable move around and take advantage of bet-
ter education and employment opportunities, beyond 
their own areas of residence.  
Emphasis should be put on the social opportunities pro-
moted by climate action, at home and within partner 
countries. An important test for the EGD is precisely the 
extent to which it can pursue its objectives in a socially just 
manner. The biggest efforts cannot be expected from low-
income groups and countries. For the latter, initial nega-
tive targets may be allowed to spur convergence over 
time. A key premise of the EGD is that climate action is not 
an ‘assault’ on well-being. Climate breakdown threatens 
to destroy the very foundation of human living conditions 
on the planet. Failing to act is the real threat to human sur-
vival, let alone well-being. At the same time, climate action 
can become an opportunity to create new jobs, from high-
skilled jobs in research, at the forefront of innovation, to 
low-skilled jobs in construction or transport for example. 
Between 2000 and 2016, despite the economic crisis, in 
the EU alone employment in the environmental goods and 
services sector grew by 38% (Eurostat, 2019).  
Another condition for successfully implementing the EGD 
is a solid understanding of its political ramifications. A gen-
uine effort by the EU to reduce its material footprint can 
be an effective way of cutting the ground from under the 
feet of powerful rent-seekers who resist climate action, in 
Europe and abroad. This should be done while actively 
supporting a diversification of the EU’s partner countries’ 
economies towards sectors that can be more decentral-
ised and less prone to falling into the hands of a few peo-
ple. While raw materials and fossil fuels are naturally con-
centrated and therefore easier to appropriate through 
large-scale infrastructure, renewable energies are more 
scattered, their exploitation could be engineered from the 
start to ensure widespread control. This kind of decentral-
ised thinking should be hardwired in other economic sec-
tors the EU promotes through its international coopera-
tion.  
In short, the EGD could become an opportunity to set a 
new narrative if it can deliver on bold targets to reduce the 
footprint of the EU’s economy, if these efforts are imple-
mented in a socially just manner, and if its political impli-
cations, at home and internationally, are fully understood 
and taken into account by EU policy-makers.  
The European Green Deal and EU external action  
Technology, digital innovation and creative financing cer-
tainly play a role in the internal and external dimensions 
of the European Green Deal, but they are not central to 
solving our predicament. Only once the technocratic veil 
of ignorance has been shed, does the depth of climate 
change politics become fully visible. The first step for EU 
policy-makers is therefore to understand the power struc-
tures behind climate change, uncover who gains from the 
status quo, who suffers, and whether the latter have the 
leverage, capacity, influence and critical mass to champion 
the necessary change.  
As in the examples outlined above, between a quarter and 
a third of global natural resources trade is currently linked 
to Europe. If the EU was to significantly reduce its absolute 
consumption of such resources, rent-seekers in exporting 
countries would see their power base shrink and the ad-
vantages they derive from controlling these flows – finan-
cial and political influence, for instance – reduced. This 
would make them more vulnerable to democratic de-
mands for fairer distribution coming from their popula-
tions. EU foreign policy actors should be aware of these 
dynamics, help manage and, when possible, even support 
these transitions.  
To effectively do so, EU external action (diplomatic, devel-
opment, trade and other policies) should be based on 
sound political economy analysis with a climate focus to 
decipher the dominant systems of rent-seeking, especially 
in carbon-intensive sectors, the main actors resisting cli-
mate action, their strengths and vulnerabilities, as well as 
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the EU’s current role (positive or negative). Rent-seeking 
is not confined to fossil fuels and minerals. Rents associ-
ated with the outflow of agricultural production can as 
easily be captured by powerful interests. The fires in the 
Amazon rainforest in 2019 exposed the link between Bra-
zil’s soybean exports – mostly imported as animal feed by 
China and the EU, which happen to be also the world’s 
largest meat producers – and deforestation. Who profits 
from the global soybean trade? Who suffers from its col-
lateral damages? In the relevant countries and sectors, the 
answers to this kind of questions should inform EU action. 
Rent-seeking is not limited to exports; imports can also be 
captured, for example through exclusive monopolies and 
licenses keeping competitors at bay. The inflow of high-
value European products, such as cars, can fall prey to such 
mechanisms. In Tunisia, former president Ben Ali used to 
award the exclusive authorisations to sell foreign cars to 
his nephews and cronies. Sometimes he even intervened 
to raise import quotas of certain car brands and thus redi-
rect more profits to his protégés. These dynamics, includ-
ing the complicity of European operators, in this case the 
car industry, help understand the vested interests favour-
ing car ownership to the detriment of more sustainable 
mobility options. The capture of state funding, for instance 
via fossil fuel subsidies, or tax breaks for carbon-intensive 
sectors, are other ways of creating and reinforcing rent-
seeking. 
Climate action requires large redistributive efforts and will 
therefore be met with strong opposition. The resistance of 
established rent-seekers might sometimes be so strong 
that EU action must lower its ambition to a level where 
change can be sustained. This will require humbleness, 
flexibility as well as risk-taking in the way the EU works. 
Climate change as such might not be at the top of every-
one’s mind but its multiple impacts – floods, droughts, pol-
lution – are felt in the lives of people, especially the vul-
nerable. The EU needs to become their allies and design its 
programmes around their problems rather than one-size-
fits-all financial instruments conceived, implemented and 
evaluated in an abstract world. 
The EU remains the largest provider of development aid. 
Structuring it to bring groups excluded from power into 
the decision-making process should be an imperative. A 
system based on extraction and marginalisation is by de-
fault impenetrable to participation and innovation, includ-
ing eco-innovation. EU leverage should be instrumental to 
opening cracks in the prevailing forms of rent-seeking, di-
rectly or, when this is not possible, through indirect entry 
points such as decentralised energy production options 
that share control over resources more broadly, public 
mobility solutions giving low-income households alterna-
tives to the automobile trap, or improved waste manage-
ment, creating better livelihoods for those involved in the 
sector (like informal garbage pickers). 
If rents associated with natural resources and other inter-
national flows are more likely to be captured by national 
governments and central power holders, local actors like 
municipalities, when empowered, are the firefighters of 
climate action – dealing with the mess of waste, traffic 
congestion, urbanisation, flooding, water and sanitation 
problems – and therefore the EU’s natural allies. Another 
strong call the EU should heed comes from young people, 
especially the generations born after 2000. ‘Fridays for Fu-
ture’ marches have been held even on the streets of Kabul. 
The climate strike movement is led by a generation that 
can be expected to still be alive by the end of this century 
when the effects of climate change are bound to be most 
severe in the absence of decisive action during the 2020s. 
Ultimately, helping powerless people and groups organise 
and stand up for collective action is key to change course. 
This is where the EU, at home and internationally, can 
make a difference.  
Conclusion 
Humanity faces an unprecedented challenge as climate 
change threatens to destroy the foundations of its survival 
on earth. However, the international community is not do-
ing enough to prevent the worst outcome. Carbon emis-
sions continue to be on a steady rise while the global econ-
omy remains firmly rooted in a degenerative system that 
feeds on endless material consumption. Business as usual 
is not enough. Climate change can no longer be viewed as 
a technical problem in need of technical solutions. Tech-
nology and finance can play a role, but they are not central 
to solving our predicament. Climate change should be 
dealt with for what it is, a political problem that affects hu-
manity in an unequal way and that will not be solved so 
long as the entrenched interests benefiting from the sta-
tus quo are not challenged. 
The European Green Deal could be an opportunity to 
break from ‘business-as-usual’. However, this is depend-
ent on its ability to scale down Europe's absolute material 
consumption and decarbonise its economy while pursuing 
these objectives in a socially just manner that demands the 
highest efforts from high-income groups and countries. To 
succeed in this effort, EU policy-makers should consider 
the full political extent of the European Green Deal, in Eu-
rope and internationally. They must strive to understand 
the power structures behind climate change, figure out 
who gains from the status quo, who suffers, and whether 
the latter have the leverage, capacity, influence and criti-
cal mass to champion the necessary change. EU action 
should therefore be based on sound political economy 
analysis with a climate focus in order to decipher the dom-
inant systems of rent-seeking, especially in carbon-inten-
sive sectors, the main actors resisting climate action, their 
strengths and vulnerabilities, as well as our potential allies. 
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